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Abstract
Intensive work on quantum computing has increased interest in quan-
tum cryptography in recent years. Although this technique is charac-
terized by a very high level of security, there are still challenges that
limit the widespread use of quantum key distribution. One of the most
important problem remains secure and effective mechanisms for the key
distillation process. This article presents a new idea for a key reconcili-
ation method in quantum cryptography. This proposal assumes the use
of mutual synchronization of artificial neural networks to correct errors
occurring during transmission in the quantum channel. Users can build
neural networks based on their own string of bits. The typical value of
the quantum bit error rate does not exceed a few percent, therefore the
strings are similar and also users’ neural networks are very similar at the
beginning of the learning process. It has been shown that the synchro-
nization process in the new solution is much faster than in the analogous
scenario used in neural cryptography. This feature significantly increases
the level of security because a potential eavesdropper cannot effectively
synchronize their own artificial neural networks in order to obtain infor-
mation about the key. Therefore, the key reconciliation based on the new
idea can be a secure and efficient solution.
1 Introduction
Quantum cryptography is a technique which can ensure a very high level of
data security. Thanks to principles of quantum mechanics, secret keys can be
established between entities/users – usually called Alice and Bob. At the same
time, an eavesdropper (called Eve) can attempt to gain information about the
key. However, measurement modifies the state of the transmitted information
and even passive eavesdropping can be discovered by Alice and Bob.
1
After quantum key distribution in the quantum channel, the users must
perform a key distillation process (consisting of quantum bit error estimation,
error correction, and privacy amplification) in order to establish the secure final
key. This process directly influences the performance of key distribution and also
the security and length of final cryptographic key. Therefore, it is desirable to
use secure and efficient methods in practical implementations. These features
are inherent in the solution presented in this article – synchronization of the
artificial neural network to correct errors occurring in quantum channel during
quantum key distribution process.
The rest of the article proceeds as follows. An introduction to quantum
cryptography – especially a description of the key distillation process – is pre-
sented in Section 2. An introduction and presentation of the artificial neural
networks used in neural cryptography follow in Section 3. The new solution
based on machine learning in error correction process is presented in Section
4. In Section 5, experimental results are discussed and compared with typical
scenarios used in neural cryptography. Finally, Section 6 concludes the article.
2 Quantum cryptography
Quantum cryptography ensures secure key distribution by means of the laws
of quantum mechanics [1]. First of all, the rules of quantum mechanics ensure
that measurement modifies the state of the transmitted qubit (quantum bit).
This modification can be discovered by the sender and the receiver of qubits.
Therefore, quantum cryptography requires two types of channels to be defined:
• the quantum channel, where qubits with the information about the
distributed key are exchanged and
• the public channel, which is used to check whether the communication
through the quantum channel is distorted. Also, this channel is used for
the correction of wrong bits.
The other rule of quantum mechanics which makes quantum cryptography
a very secure solution is the no-cloning theorem [2]. According to this theorem,
it is not possible to create identical copies of an unknown quantum state [3].
Therefore, an eavesdropper is not able to clone the original qubit to measure
the quantum state and send the second qubit to the proper receiver.
We can split quantum cryptography into two main steps: the quantum key
distribution protocol (e.g. BB84 protocol) and the key distillation algorithms
(quantum error bit estimation, error correction and privacy amplification).
2.1 Quantum key distribution
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is used to distribute an encryption key for
symmetric ciphers [4] (not to transmit messages between users). As has been
mentioned, the security of QKD relies on the foundations of quantum mechan-
ics and information about a key is transmitted by means of qubits. We could
2
distinguish two types of QKD protocols: based on single and entangled parti-
cles [5].
In the first group – QKD protocols based on single particles – information
about the distributed key is coded by means of quantum states of single par-
ticles (such as polarized photons). The quantum states of the particles do not
depend on each other and each particle brings information which can be read
independently.
The second group is based on entanglement. The entangled state of two
particles has the following feature: the states of particles are random (indeter-
minate) before the measurement is performed but if we measure the state of
the first particle, then the state of the second particle is fully determined. This
means that we only need to measure one particle to know the states of them
both. It is worth mentioning that the entanglement still retains this feature
even if the particles are separated.
Today, we know a lot of QKD protocols but only a few are used in prac-
tice [6]. The first protocol invented was BB84 [7], presented in 1984 by Bennett
and Brassard. This protocol is based on single particles (polarized photons).
Another protocol based on single particles is B92 – developed by one of the
creators of BB84, Bennett, in 1992 [8]. It is simpler and faster than its prede-
cessor. Furthermore, it is more efficient because it detects eavesdroppers faster.
A well-known QKD protocol based on entanglement is E91, invented in 1991 by
Ekert [9]. It was an innovative solution which used the phenomenon of entangled
particles for the first time. In principle, many other protocols, such as BBM92
[10] (proposed by Bennett, Brassard and Mermin in 1992) or SARG04 [11] (pro-
posed by Scarano, Acn, Ribordy, and Gisin in 2004) are modified versions of
the BB84 protocol.
2.2 Key distillation
During the quantum key distribution process, Alice and Bob use two commu-
nication channels: quantum and public. In the quantum channel, information
is coded by means of quantum states. In the public channel Alice and Bob
exchange data to check whether Eve is eavesdropping. However, the public
channel is necessary for more cases.
It is not only Eve that is responsible for errors in the quantum channel.
Errors during quantum communication may occur because of disturbance in
the quantum channel, optical misalignment, noise in detectors, or other factors.
Therefore, Alice and Bob have to estimate the error rate and decide if there is
an eavesdropper in between or not. In practice, they compare a small portion of
a distributed raw key through the public channel and compute the quantum bit
error rate (QBER). The portion of compared bits can depend on the security
requirements [12]. If QBER exceeds a given threshold, it means that Eve has
eavesdropped (or the quantum channel is too noisy to perform a proper key
distribution). But if the error rate is low enough, Alice and Bob continue
further distillation of the key. Of course, they must delete the compared part
of the raw key for security reasons.
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After the bit error estimation, Alice and Bob use key distillation protocols.
These protocols usually involve two steps: key reconciliation (error correction)
and privacy amplification.
As mentioned previously, quantum communication is not perfect and some
errors usually occur. If the number of errors does not exceed a given thresh-
old of QBER, the reconciliation process must find and correct or delete these
errors. Alice and Bob should disclose as little information as possible by using
an appropriate reconciliation algorithm. Since they are not able to avoid the
leakage of information, they have to reject some bits of the key.
The first binary error correction method was provided by the BBBSS proto-
col. This protocol was designed by Bennett and his coworkers [13]. It requires
the parities of raw key subsets from Alice and Bob to be exchanged. BBBSS uses
several passes to correct the errors by parity check. A pseudo-random permuta-
tion is used after each pass. Two years later, Brassard and Salvail constructed
the Cascade algorithm with improved efficiency [14]. Usually, it uses four passes
and doubles block length starting from the second pass. This ensures a faster
error correction process. Nowadays, the Cascade key reconciliation algorithm is
usually used in practical implementations. Other reconciliation methods based
on the BBBSS algorithm are Furukawa-Yamazaki [15] (less efficient than the
Cascade) and Winnow protocol [16] which uses a Hamming code to reduce the
number of errors.
Alice and Bob can choose one of several known reconciliation algorithms;
however, currently the most popular reconciliation methods are algorithms which
are based on a parity check of blocks. The simplest scenario assumes that the
key is grouped into blocks of a given size. The size of a block depends on the
error rate value which was estimated before. Alice and Bob compare parities of
each block over the public channel. If their parities disagree, the block contains
an odd number of errors. This block is cut into two sub-blocks and their parities
are compared again. This procedure is continued recursively for all blocks which
contain an odd number of errors as long as errors will be corrected. After that,
both keys contain an even number of errors or none. Alice and Bob shuffle the
positions of bits and repeat the same procedure with blocks of bigger size as
long as both keys will be the same. A serious problem occurs if blocks contain
an even numbers of errors. Therefore, users must try to change the block size
or rearrange the position of errors in the string. However, this approach can be
ineffective and may even lead to failing the error correction process.
Each parity control over the public channel discloses a part of the secret
key’s information. If Eve collects the parities of many blocks, she will be able
to calculate parts of the key. Therefore, Alice and Bob must reject some bits to
reduce the eavesdropper’s knowledge about the secret key. Many rejected bits
increase the security level but unfortunately decrease the final length of the key.
It decreases the efficiency of whole QKD system. The ideal key reconciliation
algorithm should ensure an efficient and secure error correction process as well
as avoid leakage of information about the key.
At the end of the key distillation process, the privacy amplification should
be carried out. Because Eve may have gained significant knowledge of the
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key (eavesdropping in the quantum channel and in the public channel during
the bit error estimation and key reconciliation), Alice and Bob are required to
strengthen their privacy. They can delete some of the bits and construct the
final key in a specific way.
Even though it is possible to apply different solutions during the privacy
amplification process, universal hash functions are mainly used in practice. Uni-
versal families of hash functions were created by Wegman and Carter [17]. Pri-
vacy amplification with hash functions was proposed by Bennett, Brassard and
Robert [18] in 1988. In general, the algorithm is based on one-way functions
which are able to convert a large string of bits into a short binary word.
Following [18], the theorem which defines the probability of the eavesdrop-
per’s information after error correction is presented below.
Theorem 1. Assume that M is the length of the reconciled key and Eve’s
knowledge about the key is no more than E deterministic bits. Let h : {0, 1}M →
{0, 1}E be any hash function of the universal family, let S < M − E be a se-
curity parameter, and let R = M − E − S. If g : {0, 1}M → {0, 1}R is chosen
randomly, then the expected amount of information on g(x) given by knowledge
of h, g and h(x) is at most: 2−S/ log 2. This means that:
expected amount of information ≤
2−S
log 2
[bit]. (1)
The security parameter S allows the security of the final encryption key to
be controlled. By means of the theorem, we are able to increase the security of
a given QC system. Unfortunately, too many rejected bits decreases the final
length of the key, and thus the efficiency of QKD system also decreases.
If Alice and Bob perform all these steps, the final key will be significantly
reduced. This is characteristic for all quantum key distribution protocols [19].
Because each stage reduces the key length, the performance of QKD is also
reduced. Sometimes, when we want to ensure a high level of security, this
reduction is significant. Using the QKD Protocol Simulator [20] we can easily
check that e.g. 1000 qubits transmitted in the quantum channel cause approx.
300 bits of final key. Therefore improving efficiency of key distillation process
is crucial to the quantum cryptography implemented in real communication
networks.
3 Artificial neural networks
Artificial neural networks (ANN) are a family of statistical learning models
inspired by biological neural networks [21]. They are used to estimate functions
that can depend on a large number of inputs. An ANN consists of artificial
neurons (analogous to biological neurons) which are connected together. Each
connection can transmit a signal between neurons [22]. Neurons are usually
organized in layers: the first layer consist of input neurons which can send the
data to the second layer (called hidden). A neural network can have one or
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Figure 1: TPM machine
more hidden layers. The last layer – consisting of output neurons – is called the
output layer. The connections can store parameters (called weights) that can
be manipulated during calculation.
3.1 Tree Parity Machine
The most popular neural network used for cryptography purposes is the tree
parity machine (TPM) which contains only one hidden layer. An example TPM
structure is presented in Figure 1. It consists of KN input neurons, where K
is the number of neurons in the hidden layer and N is the number of inputs
into each neuron in the hidden layer. This network has only one output neuron.
Each connection between the input layer and hidden layer is characterized by
its weight, which is an integer from the range [−L,L].
The output value of neuron k in the hidden layer depends on input x and
weight w and is calculated as:
σk = sgn(
N∑
n=1
xkn ∗ wkn) (2)
where signum function is:
sgn(z) =
{
−1 z ≤ 0
1 z > 0
(3)
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The output value of the neuron in the output layer is calculated as:
τ =
K∏
k=1
σk (4)
Nowadays, the TPMs are used for establishing the secret key between users.
This usage of ANN for cryptographic purposes is called neural cryptography.
Alice and Bob use two identical neural networks which are able to synchronize
after mutual learning [23]. At the beginning of this process, each TPM generate
random values of weights but after synchronization process both users have
TPMs with the same values of weights. Therefore, Alice and Bob can construct
the secret key using synchronized weights (just change weight values into binary
string).
In order to synchronize neural networks, users generate random input (the
same for both TPMs) and compute outputs from each TPM. If the output of
Alice’s TPM is the same as Bob’s TPM, they can start the learning process for
the neural networks. If the outputs are different (one TPM generated the value
1 but the other generated the value −1), Alice and Bob must generate another
input.
We can choose any learning algorithm; however, the generalized form of
Hebbian method is the most popular in practical implementations [24]. The
new weights are calculated by means of the following formula:
w⋆kn = νL(wkn + xkn ∗ σk ∗Θ(σk, τ)) (5)
where:
Θ(σk, τ)) =
{
0 if σk 6= τ
1 if σk = τ
(6)
and function νL limits values of connections to the range [−L,L]:
νL(z) =


−L if z ≤ −L
z if − L < z < L
L if z ≥ L
(7)
As we can see, the algorithm strengthens the connections which have the same
value as the TPM output.
After the appropriate number of iterations, the synchronization process ends
and the weights of both TPM machines are the same. Then, Alice and Bob can
change weights into binary strings and use them as a secret cryptographic key.
3.2 Security of neural cryptography
Synchronization of TPMs requires communication between Alice and Bob. There-
fore, it can be eavesdropped by an intruder (Eve). The simplest passive attack
is an attempt to synchronize the Eve’s TPM machine with the TPMs belonging
to Alice and Bob. We can specify that during the synchronization process, three
events may occur:
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Figure 2: Synchronization of TPMs (Alice, Bob and intruder)
* if τAlice 6= τBob, then no TPM machine is subjected to the learning pro-
cess,
* if τAlice = τBob 6= τEve, then only the machines of Alice and Bob are
subjected to the learning process,
* if τAlice = τBob = τEve, then all machines are subjected to the learning
process.
If the output of the Eve’s TPM machine is different than the outputs of the Alice
and Bob’s machines, the learning process cannot be performed. Therefore, the
synchronization of the Eve’s TPM is slower than the synchronization of the
TPMs belonging to Alice and Bob. An example of the synchronization process
is presented in Figure 2 (TPM machines with parameters: N=8, K=6, L=2
and Hebbian learning algorithm). Alice and Bob synchronized neural networks
before 200 iterations, but attacker was not able to do it for 1000 iterations.
Unfortunately, an attack can be improved by using multiple TPM’s owned by
Eve. In this case, the attacker has many machines, each initiated with different
weights. This method increases the probability of the attacker’s success, since
it is enough that only one machine will be synchronized with Alice’s and Bob’s
machines. However, simultaneous synchronization of many TPM machines is
ineffective and users can easily improve the security by increasing the used
neural network (increasing L, N and K parameters). This results in a reduction
in the synchronization speed of the attacker.
It is worth mentioning a known improvement to the introduced simple pas-
sive attack. The event τAlice = τBob 6= τEve cannot stop Eve’s synchronization
process. This approach is known as a geometric attack [25]. The attacker can
flip the output of a selected neuron in the hidden layer before applying the
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learning process in order to correct the output τEve. Taking into account the
correlation of weights in TPMs machines belonging to Alice, Bob and Eve, the
authors of [26] considered attractive and repulsive steps of the synchronization
process. Despite the fact that a geometric attack can improve the learning pro-
cess of Eve’s TPM machine, the synchronization process is still less effective.
Finally, it was demonstrated that ANNs which interact with each other (Alice’s
and Bob’s TPMs) synchronize faster than Eve’s TPM machine.
The security of neural cryptography has been considered in a number of
papers [21, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32]. However, synchronization of TPMs can be
further improved by learning by queries [33] instead of random inputs. This
approach is based on exchanging inputs between Alice and Bob which are cor-
related to the weight vectors of the TPMs. The queries introduce a mutual
influence between Alice and Bob which is not available to an attacking Eve.
The results shown in [34] confirm that queries restore the security against co-
operating attackers.
4 Error correction based on TPMs
One of the crucial step in the quantum key distribution process is the correction
of errors. This step decides on the security level of final key, but also signifi-
cantly influences the performance of the quantum cryptography. Currently used
solutions assume parity checking and deleting bits to minimize the probability
of information leakage. Such an approach causes a significant reduction of key
length and low efficiency in the whole QKD system. In this Section, a new ap-
proach to error correction based on mutual synchronization of TPM machines
is introduced.
4.1 Applicability of TPMs
The idea for a new error correction method is the following: after the QBER
estimation step, we can use the synchronization of the TPM machines to cor-
rect errors in the quantum cryptography (instead of any other error correction
algorithm). In this way, we will be able to correct errors that occurred during
the transmission of qubits. Importantly, in this scenario, Alice’s binary string is
very similar to Bob’s string of bits. The typical value for QBER does not exceed
a few percent [35, 36, 37, 38], therefore we must correct only a small part of the
whole key. This means that the TPM machines are close to synchronization and
the learning process will finish much faster than in the case of synchronization of
random strings of bits. Of course, this increases the security level significantly.
It is worth mentioning that the presented idea – using the mutual synchro-
nization of neural networks to correct errors – is a special case when this process
makes sense. In general, TPM machines cannot be used for error correction of
digital information because we are not able to predict the final weights after the
learning process. Both TPM machines dynamically adjust their weights, there-
fore the final strings are random. However, in the case of quantum cryptography
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this feature is an advantage because we want to generate unpredictable string
of bits which can be used as a secure key.
Taking into account the software environments and hardware resources cur-
rently available, the usage of TPM-based error correction seems to be justified.
Although the time of learning processes for software implementations of TPMs
strongly depends on the hardware resources, a typical duration of one iteration
on an ordinary computer is a few milliseconds [39]. However, hardware imple-
mentation helps to shorten this time by more than thousandfold (i.e. parallel
processing using FPGA presented in [40]). Additionally, ASIC implementations
of neural cryptography in 130nm and 65nm standard-cell CMOS technologies
are available [41]. These circuits reduce implementation costs and ensure fast
synchronization of neural networks; the maximum operation frequency is several
hundred MHz which results less than one microsecond per single iteration.
Additionally, the security services and architectures being used confirm the
feasibility of TPM implementation in practice. For example, a chip-level mi-
crocomputer bus systems with TPMs introduced in [42] provides efficient data
encryption with a low hardware overhead, comparable to well-known and widely
used stream ciphers. Moreover, synchronization of ANNs was proposed to en-
vironments such as ad-hoc networks (TPMs for establishing common group
keys [43]) or wireless sensor networks with limited resources (lightweight key
agreement protocol based on TPMs known as TinyTPM [44]).
4.2 Error correction process
The use-case with the proposed solution is as follows. Let’s assume that Alice
and Bob carried out the process of quantum key distribution in the quantum
channel and they estimated the quantum bit error rate. If the QBER level is
acceptable (this means that no one eavesdropped on the quantum channel or a
very small percentage of bits were eavesdropped), the error correction process
can start.
Step 1
Alice and Bob create their own TPM machines based on their own strings
of bits. The users change string of bits into weights in their own TPM
machines (bits into numbers from the range [−L,L] ). Values {−L,−L+
1, ...L − 1, L} become weights of connections between the input neurons
and the neurons in the hidden layer. Values of parameter K (the number
of neurons in the hidden layer) and N (the number of inputs into each
neuron in the hidden layer) are chosen by Alice and Bob and can be public.
In this way, Alice and Bob construct very similar neural networks – the
TPM machines have the same structure (KN input neurons) and most of
the weights are the same. The differences are located only in the places
where errors occurred: for example, if QBER ≈ 3%, it means that ≈ 97%
of bits are correct.
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Step 2
After the construction of the neural networks, synchronization of the TPM
machines begins and continues until all weights in both machines become
the same. In order to synchronize neural networks, Alice generates ran-
dom input (an input string has KN length) and computes output from
her own TPM machine. Then, Alice informs Bob about the result (value
1 or −1) and also the generated input string. Bob computes output from
his own TPM machine, based on the input string generated by Alice. If
the output of Alice’s TPM is the same as Bob’s TPM, they can start the
learning process for the neural networks (otherwise, the different input
string is generated by Alice). The synchronization process can be based
on the Hebbian learning algorithm, which strengthens the connections
which have the same value as the TPM output. After the appropriate
number of iterations, the synchronization process ends and the weights of
both TPM machines are the same.
Step 3
When the TPM machines are synchronized, the weights are the same in
both neural networks. Therefore Alice and Bob can convert the weights
back into string of bits – the users change numbers from the range [−L,L]
into bits (in the opposite way than in Step 1). Because the both TPM
machines have been synchronized, the Alice’s string of bit is now the same
as the Bob’s string of bits. All errors have been corrected.
After this three-step error correction process, both users may use the ob-
tained string of bits for cryptography purposes, e.g. to secure communications
ensuring confidentiality, integrity or authentication.
4.3 Security considerations
The presented solution – using the mutual synchronization of TPM machines
to correct errors – is not based on parity check which causes the information
leakage, however, privacy amplification process is still recommended. It will
protect this solution against unknown attacks to TPMs, which can be proposed
in the future.
Let’s assume that before the error correction process Alice and Bob changed
string of bits into weights and created their own TPM machines. Thus, the
TPM machines contains KN input neurons with weights and each weight is an
integer from the range [−L,L]. Therefore, a single weight has 2L + 1 possible
values. The number of possible keys, which are stored using TPM is:
(2L+ 1)KN (8)
However, after each synchronization process (iteration) Eve is able to acquire
a partial information about TPMs. Taking into account the input and output
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of TPMs (value τ), Eve can reject the half of possible keys (equation 8) form
the further considerations. Therefore, after the i iterations, the number of
possibilities is reduced to:
2−i(2L+ 1)KN (9)
and this is adequate to a TPM machine with smaller number of input neurons
with weights:
(2L+ 1)KN−Z (10)
Comparing both equations (9 and 10) we are able to quantify the maximum
Eve’s knowledge after i iterations and define the reduction of key to protect
Alice and Bob against the information leakage during TPMs synchronization
process as:
Z = log(2L+1)2
i (11)
This reduction strongly depends on the parameter L. However, the reduction
of key caused by the synchronization process for the typical QBER value is
not very high. Even for small parameter L – i.e. TPMs with L = 2 used for
verification in the next section) – the reduction is a dozen or so percent. When
Alice and Bob convert the weights back into bits, they may shorten the final key
using a hash function and a proper value of the security parameter S (regarding
Equation 1). In this way, Alice and Bob reduce Eve’s knowledge of the key,
which can be collected by eavesdropping in the quantum channel and public
channel during the bit error estimation and key reconciliation steps.
Additionally, the proposed solution is characterized by higher security than
current neural cryptography solutions, where we use TPM machines to establish
cryptography key between users. In the new solution we have much faster
synchronization because the strings are very similar at the beginning of the
synchronization process. Therefore, Alice and Bob need fewer iterations to
synchronize their neural networks. However, error correction based on TPMs
is able to equalize every number of incompatible bits between Alice and Bob’s
strings of bits and it works on any value of QBER. Also, it is worth remembering
that we should use high values for TPM parameters (N, K, L) to ensure an even
higher level of protection [39].
5 Verification
Security and efficiency of every key reconciliation method are the crucial re-
quirements. It also applies to the proposed error correction based on mutual
synchronization of artificial neural networks. The number of iterations during
the synchronization of TPMs influences the security and efficiency. If the syn-
chronization of Alice and Bob’s TPMs is fast, the level of security will be high.
Therefore, the scenarios of TPMs synchronization process with typical values of
QBER are tested in this Section.
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Figure 3: Synchronization of TPMs with random chosen weights
5.1 The security of error correction based on TPMs
The number of steps during the synchronization of TPMs directly influences the
security level. However, the synchronization of an eavesdropper’s TPM machine
is slower than the synchronization of the users’ TPMs, but the initial synchro-
nization additionally increases the level of security. To verify the behaviour of
the initial synchronized TPMs, a number of simulations have been conducted.
The results were compared to typical TPMs used in neural cryptography (arti-
ficial neural networks with random chosen weights).
Figures 3 and 4 present the synchronizations of TPMs in two scenarios –
with weights randomly generated and with 95% synchronized weights at the
beginning of the synchronization process, respectively. The points in the graph
are mean values (synchronizations repeated 5000− 10000 times) and were con-
nected by dotted lines in order to help in comparison of differences. The results
were presented for the range N = [20, 25], parameter L = 2 and Hebbian learn-
ing algorithm. The number of iterations in synchronization process strongly
depends on the value of the K parameter (the figures contain three example
values: K = 6, K = 8 and K = 10).
According to predictions, the number of iterations which are needed to syn-
chronize TPMs is much smaller in scenario with ANN initially synchronized
(3 − 4 times smaller). Artificial neural networks with random chosen weights
need significantly more iterations to synchronize their weights.
Additionally, numerous simulations were performed with synchronization of
bigger ANNs in scenarios with QBER = 3% and QBER = 1%. Figure 5 presents
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Figure 4: Synchronization of TPMs with 95% synchronized weights at the be-
ginning of the synchronization process
the comparison of speed of TPMs synchronization depending on parameter K
in two scenarios: with random weights and with 97% synchronized weights at
the beginning of the TPMs synchronization process (both for N = 30). Figure
6 presents results for bigger TPMs (N = 50) and allows differences between
the synchronization of TPMs with random chosen weights and TPMs with very
similar weights (differences at 1%) to be compared.
All the presented scenarios confirm that initially synchronized TPMs require
far fewer iterations than artificial neural networks with random chosen weights.
This feature increases the level of security significantly. The proposed solution is
much more secure than neural cryptography where TPMs are used to establish
cryptographic keys using random strings at the beginning of synchronization
process.
5.2 The efficiency of error correction based on TPMs
In order to compare the efficiency of the new TPM-based approach with other
error correction algorithms (BBBSS [13] and Cascade [14]), additional tests
were performed. Following recommendation [14], it was assumed that the block
size for the BBBSS algorithm should have 0.73
QBER
bits. The blocks in the first
pass of the Cascade algorithm are of the same length. Tests were performed
for different distribution of errors in the key. It was also assumed that both
algorithms corrected all errors after four passes. Verifying the efficiency of the
tested algorithms, two different keys were chosen:
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Table 1: Comparison of the error correction algorithms
BBBSS Cascade TPM-
based
Number of
iterations
(Key lenght = 500 bits
QBER = 5%)
213 181 120
Number of
iterations
(Key lenght = 600 bits
QBER = 3%)
189 150 98
• key length = 500 bits with QBER = 5% and
• key length = 600 bits with QBER = 3%.
The results are presented in Table 1. The table contains the average number of
iterations for each tested error correction algorithm. In the case of BBBSS and
Cascade algorithms, the iteration means a parity check of a single block. The
values for TPM-based error correction come from Figure 4 (TPM parameters:
N = 25, K = 10, L = 2) and Figure 5 (TPM parameters: N = 30, K = 10, L =
2). For both key lengths tested, the number of iterations is significantly lower
for the new TPM-based approach than the BBBSS and Cascade algorithms.
6 Conclusions
In this article, a new idea for the key reconciliation method in quantum cryptog-
raphy is presented. The proposal assumes that artificial neural networks (TPM
machines) can be used to correct errors occurring in the quantum channel. Un-
like neural cryptography, the new solution is characterized by fast synchroniza-
tion of TPM machines. Typical values of QBER do not exceed a few percent,
therefore users need to correct only a small part of the key. This means that
the TPM machines used for this purpose are close to synchronization and the
learning process can finish quickly.
It was shown that the synchronization process in the new solution is much
faster than in the case where TPMs weights are chosen randomly (the typical
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scenario of neural cryptography). When the QBER value does not exceed a few
percent, the synchronization process is several times faster. This significantly
increases the level of security because of the problem with fast synchronization
of eavesdropper’s TPMs which must start from randomly generated weights.
Therefore, the key reconciliation based on the synchronization of TPM ma-
chines can be a secure and efficient solution. The presented solution can replace
the error correction algorithms currently used in the quantum key distribution
process.
Although the risk of information leakage in the proposed solution is low,
additional mechanisms should be used to increase the level of security. First of
all, the use of the privacy amplification process after the error correction process
is still recommended. Also, users can consider dividing a long key into shorter
strings and perform error correction processes separately for each string. After
that, the privacy amplification process should be performed on the whole key
(concatenated by all the strings). This approach decreases the risk of infor-
mation leakage, even if an eavesdropper could get some information about a
selected string.
Although TPM machines are not used for error correction of digital informa-
tion, this approach can be used for key reconciliation in quantum cryptography.
Mutual synchronization of TPMs dynamically adjust their weights, therefore
the final weights are not predictable. Fortunately, this is a big advantage of
key distribution, because a secure key for cryptographic purposes should be a
random string of bits. It is a very special case when artificial neural networks
can be used to correct errors.
Additionally, it is worth mentioning that error correction based on TPMs is
resistant to currently known attacks using a quantum computer. This feature
is likely to be particularly important in the near future.
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